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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
aspects of their own securities law without having to accept the entire act.
Consequently, the Uniform Act raises the standards of existing securities
statutes while achieving a certain degree of uniformity which otherwise
could not be reached at all.
DANIEL J. JOHNEDIS
CORPORATE LEGISLATION
During 1961, pursuant to a growing trend, fourteen states enacted
professional corporation laws.' In general, these new statutes have followed
two broad patterns as to professional groups covered, some allowing virtually
any professional group to incorporate, others limiting the benefit to specifically
named groups? In no enactment, however, has the professional man been
allowed to escape his traditional obligations .° The Alabama act, for example,
provides that no state law applicable to the relationship between a person
furnishing professional services and a person receiving such services is
changed by its terms. 4
 The Alabama act also provides that members of the
corporation shall not be individually liable for claims against the corporation
unless a member has personally participated in the transaction out of which
the claim arises.° Under the Illinois act a professional man's relationship
with his client is unchanged but there is no provision governing personal
liability arising out of a transaction where a member is not individually in-
volved.°
Professional corporation laws are also pending before the legislatures
of several states.? That before the Massachusetts Senate entitled "The Pro-
fessional Service Corporation Act" defines professional service as
1 The fourteen states are: Alabama, Laws 1961, No. 865; Arkansas, Laws 1961,
No. 179 (medical), Laws 1961, No. 471 (dental); Connecticut, Laws 1961, P.A. 158;
Florida, Laws 1961, No. 285; Georgia, Laws 1961, No. 285; Illinois, Laws 1961, S.D.
804; Minnesota, Laws 1961, c. 1 (1st Spec. sess.) ; Ohio, Laws 1961, S.B. 550; Oklahoma,
Laws 1961, c. 29; Pennsylvania, Laws 1961, S.B. 525; South Dakota, Laws 1961, c. 29;
Tennessee, Laws 1961, c. 350; Texas, Laws 1961, c. 158; Wisconsin, Laws 1961, c. 350.
In addition, the Supreme Court of Colorado has granted attorneys the privilege of
incorporation without the aid of an enabling statute, Colo. Sup. Ct. R. 231.
2 In Florida virtually any professional group may incorporate; in Arkansas the
benefit is limited to medical and dental corporations.
8 A qualification to this statement must be noted. The Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure, supra note 1, at § I G. provide:
that all shareholders of the corporation shall be jointly and severally liable
for all acts, errors and omissions of the employees of the corporation except
during periods of time when the corporation shall maintain in good standing
lawyers' professional liability insurance.
The above mentioned liability insurance must meet minimum standards prescribed by
the Colorado Supreme Court.
4 Ala. Laws 1961, No. 865 6.
5 Ibid.
6 Ill. Laws 1961, S.B. 804 § 6.
7 These states are: Kentucky, H. 97; Michigan, H. 64; New Jersey, S. 32; New
York, A. 2037, A. 3080, S. 1375; Massachusetts, S. 522, H. 276, H. 277. The two proposals
before the Massachusetts House are identical and hereinafter will be referred to as one.
8 Mass. S. 522 § 2 (1962).
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... any type of personal service to the public which requires
as a condition precedent to the rendering of such service the ob-
taining of a license or other legal authorization and which prior to
the passage of the act and by reason of law could not be performed
by a corporation.9
The proposal before the Massachusetts House would limit the benefit to
specifically named groups." Both the House and the Senate versions provide
that a corporation composed of a professional group may issue shares only
to those who are authorized to provide the same specific services for which
the corporation was organized." As might be expected, both proposals
leave unchanged existing laws applicable to professional relationships. 12
It is obvious that the reason for these new laws is to allow professional
groups to take advantage of deferred compensation plans under the Internal
Revenue Code." By allowing professional men to incorporate, each would
then become an "employee" of the corporation." It remains to be seen,
however, whether these new corporations will qualify for the benefits they
were created to achieve. 15
During 1961, in the interests of directorial flexibility, three more
states enacted provisions regulating board action without a formal meeting.
In California, if the articles or by-laws so provide, any action which the
board is permitted to take may be taken without a meeting "if all members
of the board shall individually or collectively consent in writing to such
action."" Action by written consent, as provided for in the statute, is
given the same effect as a unanimous vote by the board. The written con-
sent or consents must be filed with minutes of the proceedings before the
board and any writing so filed is required to state that the articles or by-laws
authorize the directors to act informally and is prima facie evidence of such
authority." The new Ohio provision is similar but makes no provision as
9 Mass. H. 276, 277 § 3 (1962).
10
 Id. Section 1. These groups are: physicians and surgeons, chiropodists, physical
therapists, dentists, veterinarians, architects, optometrists, dispensing opticians, profes-
sional engineers and land surveyors, public accountants and attorneys at law.
11 Mass. S. 522 § 9, H. 276, 277 § 3 (1962).
12 Mass. S. 522 § 7, H. 276, 277 	 10 (1962).
13 See, for example, In re the Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
"The principal reason for this change in attitude regarding these professional groups
appears to arise out of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 ... which
permit an employer to establish a pension fund for the benefit of his employee." Id. at
556.
The case is interesting in that the Florida Bar Association deemed it necessary or
advisable to petition the Supreme Court of Florida to enable its members to qualify
for the Florida Professional Service Corporation Act, supra note 1. The petition was
granted subject to specified conditions.
14 The employer-employee relationship is a basic requirement of a qualified plan,
Int. Rev. Code § 401 (1954), Treas. Regs. § I.401-1(b).
15 For a discussion of this problem see Comment, Taxation of Unincorporated
Medical Groups, 1 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 260 (1960).
10 Cal. Corp. Code § 814.5 (Supp. 1961).
17 Ibid.
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to the evidentiary effect of a written consent filed upon the corporate rec-
ords." In Illinois, written consent of all the directors entitled to vote on a
particular issue is sufficient, whether or not the articles or by-laws so pro-
vide."
These new acts resemble statutes in other states which have been opera-
tive for some time. For example, in Pennsylvania if all the directors severally
or collectively consent in writing to any action "to be taken by the corpora-
tion," such action shall be as valid "as though it had been authorized at a
meeting of the board of directors." 2° The Delaware statute expressly provides
that prior to action by the board without a meeting, such action must be
consented to in writing by all the directors and filed with minutes of the
proceedings before the board. 21
 Perhaps the most liberal statute in this area
is that of North Carolina. In North Carolina, action taken by a majority of
the board without a meeting is valid if (1) all directors, either before or
after such action, consent in writing or, (2) all shareholders know of the
action in question and make no prompt objection or, (3) the directors are
accustomed to take informal action, this custom being generally known to
all shareholders and all directors know of such action and do not promptly
object.22
Some states liberalize the requirements for a valid board meeting
rather than provide for action without a meeting. For example, in Louisiana
the articles may allow a director who is absent at a meeting to be represented
by any other director who may, according to written instructions, vote in
place of the absentee director." The Arkansas statute, which is similar,
further provides that a director may not be a proxy for more than one
other director but a proxy need not be a director so long as he is eligible
for election as such.24
In the absence of a statute the general rule is that the board of direc-
tors is vested with the management of the corporation as a board and not
as individuals." According to this view the board has "no authority to act
save when assembled at a board meeting." 26
 There are many exceptions to
this rule; thus it has been held that unanimous consent by the board will
15 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.54 (Baldwin 1958). The Ohio statute is unusual in
that it provides for informal action by both directors and shareholders in a single
statutory provision. If the articles or by-laws so provide, all directors or shareholders,
as the case may be, who are entitled to vote may authorize informal action by con-
senting, in writing, to such action. The written consent or consents so filed must be
filed upon the records of the corporation and must recite that the action was taken
according to written authorization.
19 III. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.147.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961). Unlike the California
and Ohio statutes, supra notes 16 & 18, the Illinois statute makes no provision as to
the effect of a contra provision in the articles or by-laws of the corporation.
20 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2852-402(5).
21 Del, Code Ann. tit. 9, § 141(g) (Supp. 1960).
22 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-29 (1960).
23 La. Rev. Stat. § 12:32 (c).
24 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-406 (1957).
25 Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N.W. 261 (1879).
28 Id. at 54, 1 N.W. at 270.
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validate formal action.27
 Similarly, where the directors are in the habit of
acting informally they may bind the corporation. 28 The corporation may
also be estopped to deny the validity of an action taken informally 29
Cases have held that where the directors own all the stock of the corpora-
tion informal action by the board is valid, 20 and shareholders have au-
thority to ratify informal action taken by the board." It may thus be said
that the statutes regulating informal action by the board represent a codifica-
tion of, rather than a departure from, the existing case law. 82
MICHAEL B. SPITZ
FEDERAL TAX LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
The second session of the 87th Congress which convened on January
10, 1962,1
 has at the time of this writing passed only one tax law, the cele-
brated "Du Pont Bill."2
 There is, however, an indication that at least some
additional changes will be made in the Internal Revenue Code and, there-
fore, some of the significant proposals will also be discussed in this article.
LEGISLATION PASSED
The "Du Pont Tax Law" 3
 is a product of a rather specialized situation;
consequently, a brief glance at the events creating a need for the legislation
will help clarify a later discussion of its provisions.
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., hereafter referred to as Du Pont, was
the owner of twenty-three percent of the common stock of General Motors
Corporation, most of which it had acquired about forty years ago. 4 The
Justice Department determined that since Du Pont and General Motors
were in allied fields, Du Pont's holdings in General Motors constituted a
violation of the antitrust laws. As a result a complaint was filed in 1949
and there began a protracted litigation of the issue. 3
27
 Sherman v. Fitch, 98 Mass. 59 (1867).
28
 Scott V. Cord, 75 Nev. 179, 336 P.2d 773 (1959).
29
 Jourdan v. Long Island R.R., 115 N.Y. 380, 22 N.E. 153 (1889).
28
 Gerard v. Empire Square Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 244, 187 N.Y. Supp. 306
(1921).
81
 Merchant's & Farmer's Bank v. Harris Lumber Co., 103 Ark. 283, 146 S.W.
508 (1912).
32
 It may be observed that the North Carolina statute, supra note 22 is a striking
example of case law which has been enacted into a statutory code. On the general subject
of informal action by the board of directors, cf. 2 Fletcher, Corporations § 391 et. seq.
(1954 rev. ed.) ; Ballantine, Corporations § 42 et. seq. (1946).
1 108 Cong. Rec. 1 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1962),
2 Public Law 87-403, 76 Stat. 4 (1962).
2 Supra note 2.
4 S. Rep. No. 1100, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
5
 Supra note 4.
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